THE DANGER OF A COLLISION COURSE

On the surface, America’s relations with China seem to be rather cordial. Tensions spiked in April 2001 over the incident in which a U.S. spy plane collided with a Chinese fighter plane, but that quarrel soon receded, and ever since the September 11 terrorist attacks China and the United States have cooperated in the campaign against radical Islamic terrorism. More recently, Washington and Beijing have worked together to induce North Korea to give up its nuclear weapons program. Meanwhile, the important economic relationship has continued to grow, with bilateral trade now exceeding $160 billion a year.

Despite these components of a cooperative relationship, there are in the United States vocal advocates of a more hard-line policy toward the People’s Republic of China. Indeed, in recent years critics of the current policy have redoubled their efforts on a number of issues. The hard-liners have sought to get the U.S. government to press China on its abuses of human rights, to increase arms sales to Taiwan, to restrict the export of high technology (especially dual use) products to the PRC, to sanction China for its proliferation of key weapons systems to unfriendly regimes, and to adopt a number of protectionist trade measures to reduce the bilateral trade deficit (and perhaps retard China’s economic development).

Pressure from the hard-liners has had some effect on U.S. policy regarding several of those issues, but generally that impact has been only at the margins. For example, there have been more restrictions on high-tech exports to China on national security grounds than during the Clinton years. U.S. officials also have expressed public criticism of Beijing’s human rights record-although that criticism has become less frequent and more muted during recent years. Perhaps most significant, the United States has imposed sanctions against Chinese companies a dozen times in the past four years for alleged proliferation activities, and Washington has exerted intense diplomatic pressure on Beijing regarding that issue.¹

These are all measures that advocates of a hard-line policy have been pushing for years. The Cox Committee report in 1999, which charged that China was using espionage and imported strategic goods to build up the PRC’s military power, especially generated pressure for restraints on technology trade among political conservatives.² A rather alarming July 2002 report to Congress by the U.S.China Security Review Commission (established by the Defense Authorization Act of 2001) on the national security implications of the economic relationship between the United States and China intensified calls for action on the trade front.³ It was significant that this congressionally established bipartisan committee of outside experts had a disproportionate number of China critics in its membership.

In evaluating the call for trade restrictions, it is difficult to separate national security motives from purely self-serving economic motives. This is particularly true with regard to the Bush administration’s ongoing campaign to get China to revalue its currency. U.S. competitors have long complained that the PRC manipulates the value of the yuan, keeping it artificially low to make Chinese goods more competitive in the world market. The administration has grudgingly responded to the demand of its domestic economic constituencies that something be done about that problem. Although Beijing has been just grudgingly responsive on the currency revaluation issue, Chinese officials do seem concerned about the mounting calls in the United States for punitive measures to narrow the trade deficit. For example, in late 2003 and early 2004, China announced the purchase of billions of dollars worth of American goods, including airplanes, jet engines, and auto parts.

Some calls for commercial sanctions against China appear to involve a mixture of economic and security motives. How proponents of a hard-line policy combine those issues can be gauged by the comments of William R. Hawkins, senior fellow at the U.S. Business and Industry Council (USBIC), a prominent economic nationalist think tank in Washington. Hawkins called for countervailing duties on Chinese imports "across the board" to close the yawning trade deficit. Although one of the reasons he cited was the need to prevent the further loss of American manufacturing jobs, he also stressed that the trade deficit was not the only concern. He specifically warned Americans of an insidious Chinese ploy to narrow the deficit. "Beijing’s gambit is to renew calls for a relaxation of import restrictions on sensitive technology, especially technology with military application, as the way to boost American exports. China has long chafed under security restrictions and has circumvented them whenever possible, often with the aid of the same avaricious American firms who lobby on Beijing’s behalf." Americans must not succumb to that ploy, Hawkins emphasized. "All China really wants from the United States is technology, and the capital and know-how needed to replicate it. Opening the gates to Beijing in strategic trade might narrow the deficit somewhat in the short run, but in the long run the adverse impact on both U.S. competitiveness and national security would be catastrophic."⁴ Hawkins also warned that Beijing’s policies were "part of China’s drive to become the strongest economy in Asia and to overturn the global balance of power that currently favors the United States."⁵ His views represented the perfect marriage of trade protectionist motives and national security concerns. To this point, his views are shared only by a minority-but a substantial minority-in Congress, the foreign policy community, and the general public. That this minority exists is important because it shows that a significant reservoir of hostility toward the PRC already exists in the United States-a reservoir that easily could be tapped in the event of a crisis.

In the PRC, there are counterparts to the U.S. neoconservatives and economic nationalists who urge Beijing to adopt a more assertive policy toward the United States. Those hard-liners are especially numerous in the upper ranks of the People’s Liberation Army. One prominent example of this assertive policy is a book, Unrestricted Warfare, published in 1999 by two colonels in the PLA.⁶ The book’s analysis and arguments are directed at one basic end: identifying weaknesses in the U.S. military and ways of exploiting them. The book goes into great detail about what the authors’ perceive as America’s strategic weaknesses: an undue reliance on technology, a hypersensitive aversion to casualties, and alleged weaknesses in joint war-fighting integration. In addition to the military analysis, the underlying assumption of Unrestricted Warfare is that the United States is an implacable enemy of China and that someday the PRC must confront its adversary militarily.

Michael Pillsbury, a leading scholar of Chinese affairs, has audited much of the available material from military strategists inside the PRC and notes that "not one of the more than 200 books" reviewed for his study "admitted that the United States could defeat China in any scenario-but many techniques can supposedly defeat U.S. forces."⁷ In addition, "a common theme in PLA views of future warfare [is that] America is proclaimed to be a declining power with but two or three decades of primacy left."⁸ The undertone of the Chinese analyses is a mixture of hostility and disdain toward the United States.

Wang Yiwei, assistant to the dean of China’s prestigious Fudan University, penned a December 2004 article in which he noticed some disturbing trends in the attitudes of Chinese opinion leaders regarding U.S.-China relations. "In the eyes of Chinese strategists, ‘the America Opportunity Theory’ has been replaced by ‘the America Threat Theory.’ Strident voices can be heard concerning the serious situation of ‘Taiwan independence,’ saying that China will not scruple to have a strategic showdown with the U.S."⁹

Hard-liners are sometimes able to rouse China’s population into anti-America outbursts. The most vivid example was the reaction to the U.S. bombing of the Chinese embassy in Belgrade during the Balkan war in May 1999. Although President Bill Clinton and other U.S. officials immediately sought to apologize for what Washington described as a horrible accident, the PRC was unforgiving. Chinese officials and opinion leaders openly charged that the attack was deliberate, perpetrated by anti-Chinese elements within the U.S. military and foreign policy bureaucracies. A negative reaction was probably inevitable, but what occurred during the days following the bombing incident went beyond a normal response. Mobs of Chinese young people attacked American businesses and other targets in Shanghai, Beijing, and other cities.¹⁰ The mob violence against the U.S. embassy and the ambassador’s residence was so severe-a barrage of rocks, bottles, and firebombs-that Ambassador James Sasser dared not leave the residence for three days.

Chinese authorities took steps to prevent similar violent, large-scale demonstrations during the April 2001 spy plane incident, perhaps fearing that they would again get out of control. Internet chat rooms in China teemed with anti-American sentiment, however.¹¹ That was significant in that internet users are likely to be more affluent, more educated, urban dwellers-in other words, the type of Chinese who would normally favor a more open political system and be friendly to America and American values. Instead, many of them expressed an extremely virulent variety of Chinese nationalism.

Those episodes suggest a sizeable undercurrent of hostility toward the United States among members of China’s elite as well as the general public. In normal times, the numerous ties that link the interests of the United States and the PRC keep such sentiments in the background. In a time of crisis, though, the outcome could be very different.

The trade deficit, China’s proliferation activities, and the PRC’s human rights abuses pose problems in the relationship between the United States and China. So do sharp differences over China’s expansive territorial claims in the South China Sea, the Bush administration’s doctrine of preemptive war (which Beijing vehemently opposes), and a variety of other issues. But it is virtually impossible to imagine any of them leading to an armed conflict. The sole exception is the status of Taiwan. And, given the overall fragile nature of the U.S.-PRC relationship, Taiwan could become the occasion for a very nasty confrontation indeed.

Beijing insists that Taiwan is merely a renegade province of the People’s Republic of China, and although Chinese officials state that the PRC wants to settle the dispute by peaceful means, they also have consistently refused to renounce the use of force to achieve reunification. Renunciation is an option that they will not entertain even in private, off-the-record discussions. That is true even when the concession is presented as part of a quid pro quo for the termination of U.S. arms sales to Taiwan-something Beijing wants very much.¹² Taiwan seems to be one of those emotional "hot button" issues that galvanize mainland Chinese, including those who are less than passionate supporters of the government on other topics.

It is often difficult for Americans and other Westerners to comprehend the depth of Chinese determination to get Taiwan to "return to the motherland." But to many (and probably most) Chinese, Taiwan is the most potent remaining symbol of China’s long period of weakness and dependence, which began in the early nineteenth century, and its shabby treatment at the hands of various colonial powers. For the Chinese, the inheritors of an ancient and proud culture, that treatment was profoundly humiliating and opened deep emotional wounds that have yet to heal fully. It was during the period of weakness that Britain wrested Hong Kong away from China’s control; that Japan seized Taiwan (and later Manchuria); that czarist Russia amputated portions of Chinese territory along their border; and that France, Germany, and other countries established colonies or enclaves. That is why the return of Hong Kong to China in 1997 was such a crucial event-with the emotional symbolism transcending its admittedly significant economic importance. The last of the European enclaves, Macao, was restored to Beijing’s jurisdiction in 1999. Taiwan is now the principal piece of traditional Chinese territory that has yet to be recovered. That fact alone makes Taiwan’s status a potentially explosive issue.

There are elements within the People’s Liberation Army who seem willing to threaten military force-and perhaps even use military force-to resolve the Taiwan issue. So far, the civilian leadership of the Chinese Communist Party appears to be more cautious. Beijing has not yet decided to use coercion to achieve reunification, but it is equally apparent that the PRC political elite regards the use of force as a viable option if peaceful alternatives prove ineffective. Any one of a number of developments could put a coercive strategy in motion: the emergence of a more hard-line PRC government, evidence that pro-independence sentiment on Taiwan was becoming dominant, or simply frustration on the mainland with the prospect of an indefinite stalemate. The latter danger may increase as communism fades as a unifying force in China. The most likely substitute unifying force would be Chinese nationalism-and Taiwan is the most important, emotionally laden, nationalist issue.

At the same time that China is becoming more confrontational about the Taiwan issue, separatist sentiments are growing in Taiwan-especially among younger Taiwanese. To them, China is an alien country.¹³ A vibrant, distinct society has grown up on Taiwan, and many Taiwanese point out that their island has been ruled from Beijing only 4 years out of the last 110-and the government in question was not communist. Taiwan has developed separately from the mainland, and it is understandable if many Taiwanese want that reality ratified by having an independent state that enjoys full international recognition. True, the bulk of the Taiwanese business community favors close ties with the mainland, and that faction is an important force for caution and restraint, helping to counteract the influence of the pro-independence faction.¹⁴ But the overall trend seems clear. Numerous public opinion surveys show that very few Taiwanese are interested in reunification with a communist China. Indeed, a growing number of Taiwanese may not be interested in reunification even if the mainland someday becomes democratic. At the very least, there is a broad consensus in favor of the island’s current de facto independence, and most Taiwanese want some form of political recognition from the international community.

The divergent attitudinal trends on the mainland and Taiwan leave little room for compromise. Given the intensity of the emotions on both sides of the Strait, it is uncertain how long the modus vivendi that has existed since Washington’s rapprochement with the PRC in the 1970s can endure. Both Beijing and Taipei seem increasingly dissatisfied with the status quo built around Taiwan’s acceptance of being in political and diplomatic limbo. They also have sharply conflicting prescriptions for resolving the impasse. Beijing advocates the formula of "one country, two systems," which would mean a status for Taiwan similar to that granted Hong Kong, albeit with somewhat greater autonomy. Taipei categorically rejects that solution. During the years of control by the Kuomintang Party from the late 1940s until the mid-1990s, Taiwanese leaders at least implicitly accepted the concept of one China. But the formula under KMT President Lee Teng-hui in the late 1990s shifted to "one China, two states." The model Lee and his supporters seemed to be advocating was the two Germanys during the latter stages of the Cold War. That option, though, was anathema to the PRC.

When the Democratic Progressive Party won Taiwan’s presidency in 2000, sentiment for an independent Taiwan intensified. Under the current president, Chen Shui-bian, even the pro forma acceptance of one China has largely been abandoned. According to Chen, one China is merely one possible outcome of negotiations between two sovereign and equal states: the Republic of China (Taiwan’s official name) and the PRC. Moreover, a sizable portion of the Democratic Progressive Party’s membership is even more radical than Chen. And the DPP’s junior partner in the "Pan Green" electoral alliance-the Taiwan Solidarity Union-makes the DPP look anemic on the independence issue. To staunchly pro-independence elements in both the DPP and the TSU, the ultimate goal of negotiations with Beijing is not reunification but formal separation.

The United States has pursued a policy that seeks both to preserve friendly ties with Beijing and protect Taiwan’s de facto independence. As developed during the 1980s and 1990s, that policy incorporated the doctrine of strategic ambiguity. On the one hand, Washington officially adheres to a one-China policy and does not dispute Beijing’s contention that Taiwan is part of China. On the other hand, the 1979 Taiwan Relations Act mandates that the United States sell defensive arms to Taiwan and regard any PRC effort to coerce Taiwan as a grave breach of the peace. Left ambiguous is whether the United States would intervene with its own military forces in the event of a Chinese attack on the island. The point of strategic ambiguity is to keep both sides guessing about U.S. intentions. The rationale is that Taiwan would have to wonder whether the United States would really come to its rescue if Taiwanese leaders needlessly provoked Beijing by pushing an independence agenda. Conversely, Beijing would have to suspect that the United States would defend Taiwan. Therefore, both sides have an incentive to act cautiously.

Strategic ambiguity worked reasonably well until the mid-1990s, when a newly democratic Taiwan began to push the envelope regarding independence and the PRC reacted with ever more pointed warnings. During the past decade, U.S. leaders have tinkered at the margins of strategic ambiguity even as signs continue to mount that a confrontation between Beijing and Taipei is a very real danger. As the United States has tried to preserve an increasingly fragile status quo, it has often created confusion and increased the risk of miscalculation by one or both parties to the Taiwan dispute. (See chapter 6.)

An especially troubling aspect of U.S. policy is that America has little control over events relevant to the Taiwan situation. To some extent, that is a problem inherent in any international trouble spot involving the United States. It is always possible for the opposing party to trigger a crisis. But the Taiwan problem is far more complicated and dangerous. The United States has to worry not only about whether its potential adversary (China) remains prudent, but also whether its client state (Taiwan) remains prudent. Indeed, in this case, Washington may have to worry more about Taipei provoking a crisis than Beijing doing so. It is dangerous to undertake any commitment to defend a client or ally, but it is especially risky when the United States does not, and probably cannot, exercise effective control over the actions of that ally or client. And that is precisely the situation today in the relationship between Washington and Taipei. That vulnerability, whereby the security patron can be dragged into a confrontation (perhaps even a full-blown war) by an excessively assertive client, is the problem that Nikolas K. Gvosdev and Travis Tanner, scholars at the National Interest, aptly refer to as the "wag the dog" phenomenon.¹⁵ Taiwan is a textbook example of that danger.

A related problem is that Taiwan is in a position to manipulate the decisionmaking process in the United States. Taipei spends a great deal of time, money, and effort not only to influence the course of action that the executive branch pursues but to cultivate support in Congress and the American opinion elite needed to push for policies that advance Taiwan’s agenda. That is another facet of the "wag the dog" problem, since such influence can cause U.S. officials to take measures that might not be in America’s best interest.

The United States is at a precarious point with regard to its policy on the Taiwan issue. "For the decade ahead, we need to keep the lid on the pressure cooker," states one high-ranking U.S. official.¹⁶ Washington may find that such a mission is beyond its ability. At the very least, it will be an increasingly frustrating and dangerous mission. Given the trends in both Taiwan and the mainland, there is growing danger of a military confrontation between the two parties sometime in the next decade that could entangle the United States. Indeed, unless significant policy changes take place in Taipei, Beijing, or Washington, a collision course is all too probable. The next chapter presents a scenario about how such a perilous confrontation might occur.

NOTES:

1. Susan V. Lawrence, "U.S. Presses China on Arms, Quietly," Wall Street Journal, October 30, 2003, p. A14; and David E. Sanger, "U.S. Punishes 8 Chinese Firms for Aiding Iran," New York Times, January 17, 2005, p. A1.
2. U.S. House of Representatives, Report of the Select Committee on U.S. National Security and Military/Commercial Concerns with the People’s Republic of China, 3 vols., 105th Cong., 2nd sess., 1999.
3. Report to Congress of the U.S.-China Security Review Commission-The National Security Implications of the Economic Relationship between the United States and China, July 2002, http://www.uscc.gov. See also Evelyn Iritani, "China Trade Poses Security Threat to U.S., Asia Panel Says," Los Angeles Times, July 12, 2003, p. A25.
4. William R. Hawkins, "Are We Serious about China?" Washington Times, November 6, 2003, p. A21.
5. Ibid.
6. Qiao Liang and Wang Xiangsui, Unrestricted Warfare (Beijing: PLA Literature and Arts Publishing House, 1999).
7. Michael Pillsbury China Debates the Future Security Environment (Washington, D.C.: National Defense University Press, 2000), p. 71.
8. Ibid., p. 77.
9. Yiwei Wang, "China’s Defensive Realism," Asia Times, December 22, 2004, www.atimes.com.
10. James Pomfret, "A Protest Beijing Can Endorse," Washington Post, May 10, 1999, p. A18.
11. Paul Eckert, "China Chat Room Seethes after U.S. Plane Collision," Reuters, April 1, 2001; and Lynne O’Donnell, "Surfers Talk Up Extreme Responses," The Australian, April 3, 2001, p. 9.
12. Author’s conversations with PRC diplomats, Washington, D.C., November and December 2004.
13. For a discussion of the growth of a distinct Taiwanese identity, see Philip P. Pan, "New National Identity Emerges in Taiwan," Washington Post, January 2, 2004, p. A13.
14. Keith Bradsher, "Still Wary, Taiwan Split over Change on the Mainland," New York Times, November 16, 2002, p. A6; and William Foreman, "Taiwanese on Mainland Support China," Washington Times, February 7, 2004, p. A7.
15. Nikolas K. Gvosdev and Travis Tanner, "Wagging the Dog," National Interest, no. 77 (Fall 2004): 5-10. 182
16. uQuoted in "Dancing with the Enemy: A Survey of Taiwan," Economist, January 15, 2005, p. 12.

SOURCE: Ted Galen Carpenter, "America’s Coming War with China: A Collision Course Over Taiwan", Palgrave Macmillan, 2005.